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Abstract 
This paper models unemployment as the result of matching frictions and job rationing. Job 
rationing is a shortage of jobs arising naturally in an economic equilibrium from the 
combination of some wage rigidity and diminishing marginal returns to labor. During 
recessions, job rationing is acute, driving the rise in unemployment, whereas matching 
frictions contribute little to unemployment. Intuitively, in recessions jobs are lacking, the 
labor market is slack, recruiting is easy and inexpensive, so matching frictions do not matter 
much. In a calibrated model, cyclical fluctuations in the composition of unemployment are 
quantitatively large. 
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© P. Michaillat, submitted 2010 1 Introduction
Unemployment spikes frequently across the U.S. and Europe, most recently in 2008–2010, and
remains a major concern for policymakers. To determine optimal policy responses, it is critical
to identify the main sources of unemployment. I propose a framework that accommodates two
important sources of unemployment: (i) job rationing, which is a shortage of jobs in the economy;
and (ii) matching frictions, which make it costly for recruiting ﬁrms to match with unemployed
workers. I study how these two sources interact over the business cycle to shed new light on the
mechanics of unemployment ﬂuctuations.
This paper develops a tractable model that distinguishesbetween two componentsof unemploy-
ment: (i) rationing unemployment, which measures the shortage of jobs in the economy, irrespec-
tive of matching frictions; and (ii) frictional unemployment, which measures additional unemploy-
ment attributable to matching frictions. Formally, I deﬁne rationing unemployment as the amount
of unemployment that would prevail if recruiting cost was zero, and frictional unemployment as
additional unemployment due to a positive recruiting cost. The paper makes four contributions
to our understanding of unemployment ﬂuctuations. First, it proposes conditions under which ra-
tioning unemployment is positive. Second, it proves theoretically that during a recession rationing
unemployment increases, driving the rise in total unemployment, while frictional unemployment
decreases. Third, it shows that even a small amount of wage rigidity, such as that estimated with
microdata on earnings of newly hired workers, is sufﬁcient to amplify technology shocks as much
as in the data. Hence, moments of key labor market variables simulated with the calibrated model
match those estimated in U.S. data well. Fourth, the paper ﬁnds that cyclical ﬂuctuations in the
composition of unemployment are quantitatively large: when unemployment is below 5 percent, it
is all frictional; but when unemployment reaches 8 percent, frictional unemployment amounts to
less than 2 percent of the labor force, and rationing unemployment to more than 6 percent.
The model departs from the literature by allowing for job rationing, a shortage of jobs resulting
from a failure of the labor market to clear even in the absence of matching frictions. Even if re-
cruiting cost is zero, workers may not all be proﬁtably employed and some unemployment, which
1I call rationing unemployment, may remain. Since recruiting cost is actually positive, total unem-
ployment is higher than rationing unemployment, and the difference between the two is frictional
unemployment.
Thereisnojobrationinginexistingsearch-and-matchingmodelsbecausetheyassumethatthere
would not be any unemployment without a positive recruiting cost. In the canonical search-and-
matching model, wages are the outcome of Nash bargaining and by construction always remain
below the marginal product of labor (Hagedorn and Manovskii 2008; Mortensen and Pissarides
1994; Pissarides 2000; Shimer 2005). Therefore if recruitment cost falls to zero, ﬁrms make a
positive proﬁt on each new match and will enter the labor market until there is full employment.
By the same logic, there is full employment in the absence of recruiting costs in models using
different bargaining procedures (Cahuc et al. 2008; Elsby and Michaels 2008; Hall and Milgrom
2008; Rotemberg 2008). Shimer (2004) and Hall (2005a) introduce wage rigidity into search-and-
matching models, in the form of a constant real wage. But since these models assume atomistic
ﬁrms for simplicity, the marginal product of labor is independent of aggregate employment. Thus
if productivity is above the constant wage and recruitment cost falls to zero, ﬁrms enter until there
is full employment. Job rationing is absent from these atomistic-ﬁrm models with rigid wages,
and likewise from large-ﬁrm models with wage rigidity and either constant marginal returns to
labor in production, or diminishing marginal returns to labor and instantaneous capital adjustment
(Blanchard and Gal´ ı 2010; Gertler and Trigari 2009).
To provide a more general framework in which unemployment may arise from both matching
frictions and job rationing, this paper builds on the Pissarides (2000) model by relaxing two of
its key assumptions: completely ﬂexible wages and constant marginal returns to labor. These
assumptions are critical because either implies that there would not be any unemployment without
a positive recruiting cost. Speciﬁcally, I develop a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model
in which large ﬁrms face a labor market with matching frictions, as in Blanchard and Gal´ ı (2010).
All household members are in the labor force at all times, either working or searching for a job.
Firms open vacancies to hire new workers each period in response to exogenous job destruction
and technologyshocks. Recruitingis costlybecause ofmatchingfrictions, especiallyin expansions
2when ﬁrms post many vacancies that are ﬁlled from a small pool of unemployed workers. I assume
that ﬁrms face diminishing marginal returns to labor in production. I introduce rigid wages, which
do not adjust as much as technology. In a frictional labor market, rigid wages are a possible
equilibrium outcome. Even if wages are rigid, they may remain in the interval between the ﬂow
value of unemployment and the marginal product of labor, and neither interfere with the efﬁcient
formation of worker-ﬁrm matches nor cause inefﬁcient match destructions. In that case, wages
satisfy the equilibrium requirement that worker-ﬁrm pairs exploit all the bilateral gains from trade
(Hall 2005a).
Assuming diminishing marginal returns to labor and wage rigidity is appealing for several rea-
sons. First, both assumptions have been used (but not combined) in the search-and-matching lit-
erature, and are standard in the broader macroeconomic literature.1 Second, both are empirically
relevant. At business cycle frequency, some production inputs are slow to adjust and the short-run
production function is likely to exhibit diminishing marginal returns to labor. Substantial ethno-
graphic and empirical literatures also document wage rigidity.2 Third, job rationing can be readily
quantiﬁed, because diminishingmarginal returns to labor can be calibrated using aggregate data on
the labor share, and the response of wages to technology shocks has been estimated with microdata
on individual wages.
The fundamental property of this model is that there may be some unemployment even in the
absence of matching frictions. To understand why jobs may be rationed, I ﬁrst abstract from re-
cruiting expenses. Since there is perfect competition in the goods market, ﬁrms hire workers until
marginal product of labor equals wage. The marginal product of labor decreases with employment
because of diminishing marginal returns. In response to a negative technology shock, the marginal
product of labor falls whereas rigid wages adjust downwards only partially. If the shock is sufﬁ-
1There is a long tradition of macroeconomic models featuring a short-run production function with labor as the
only variable input, and with diminishingmarginalreturns to labor (for example, Benigno and Woodford 2003). Wage
rigidity features in the many dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models that use the Taylor (1979) and Calvo
(1983) staggered wage-setting mechanisms, and Christiano et al. (2005) argue that wage rigidity is important for
improving realism in this class of models.
2Blinder and Choi (1990), Campbell and Kamlani (1997) and Bewley (1999) provide ethnographic evidence.
Kramarz (2001) surveys studies based on wage microdata. Dickens et al. (2007) provide recent evidence from Eu-
ropean wage microdata.
3ciently large, the marginal product of labor of the last workers in the labor force may fall below the
wage. It becomes unproﬁtable for ﬁrms to hire these workers. Some unemployment, which I call
rationing unemployment, would prevail even if recruiting cost was nil. With a positive recruiting
cost, the marginal cost of labor is higher and ﬁrms reduce employment. The resulting amount of
additional unemployment is frictional unemployment.
In recessions marginal proﬁtability falls further and job rationing is more acute. Rationing
unemploymentincreases, drivingtheriseintotalunemployment. Manyunemployedworkers apply
to the few vacancies left. Each vacancy is ﬁlled rapidly and at a low cost in spite of matching
frictions. Since recruiting expenses barely raise the marginal cost of labor, proﬁt-maximizing
ﬁrms barely reduce employmentcompared to thelevel prevailingin theabsence of recruiting costs.
Therefore, frictional unemployment is lower in recessions than in normal times. To summarize,
in expansions, matching frictions explain all of unemployment. In recessions, falling technology
leads to an acute shortage of jobs that drives an increase in total unemployment; simultaneously,
the amount of additional unemployment attributable to matching frictions falls because it becomes
easier for ﬁrms to recruit.
I commence the analysis with a theoretical study of the comovements of unemployment and its
components using comparative statics with respect to technology. I opt to work in a model without
aggregate uncertainty because it has the same qualitative behavior as the fully dynamic model,
in spite of the dynamic nature of ﬁrms’ decisions and the dynamic adjustment process of unem-
ployment. Moreover its equilibrium can be studied analytically and represented diagrammatically.
Next, I use numerical methods to quantify frictional and rationing unemployment in a stochastic
environment that accounts fully for rational expectations of ﬁrms as well as the law of motion of
unemployment.
I calibrate the model with U.S. data and simulate the impact of technology shocks. Simulated
moments for labor market variables are close to their empirical counterparts. Critically, even a
high estimate of wage ﬂexibility, such as that obtained by Haefke et al. (2008) using microdata on
earnings of new hires, is sufﬁcient for the model to amplify technology as much as in the data. I
construct a historical time series for unemployment by simulating the model with the technology
4series measured in U.S. data over the 1964–2009 period. Model-generated unemployment and
actual unemployment match closely. The model ﬁts the data well despite its simplicity, lending
support to the quantitative analysis that follows.
I decompose model-generated unemployment into historical time series for frictional and ra-
tioning unemployment. This simulation uncovers quantitatively large cyclical ﬂuctuations in fric-
tional and rationing unemployment. In the model, as long as total unemployment is below 4.8
percent, it can all be attributed to matching frictions. On average, total unemployment amounts to
5.8percent ofthelaborforce, frictionalunemploymentto3.6 percent, and rationingunemployment
to 2.2 percent. But in deep recessions, when total unemployment reaches 8.0 percent, rationing
unemployment increases above 6.0 percent, while frictional unemployment decreases below 2.0
percent.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the general model on which my analy-
sis rests. Section 3 frames several inﬂuential search-and-matching models as special cases of the
general model to show that they do not have job rationing. Section 4 theoretically studies unem-
ployment and its components in a speciﬁc model in which job rationing arises from wage rigidity
and diminishing marginal returns to labor. Section 5 calibrates this speciﬁc model to quantify
ﬂuctuations in rationing and frictional unemployment. Section 6 discusses normative implications
and relates this work to the macroeconomic literature on unemployment. All proofs are in the
Appendix.
2 General Model




3This model takes the view that recessions are driven by aggregate-activity shocks and not by reallocation shocks,
in line with empirical evidence (Abraham and Katz 1986; Blanchard and Diamond 1989; Hall 2005b). Thus I assume
a stable matching function and, following the literature, I introduce aggregate technology shocks.
52.1 Household
The representative household is composed of a mass 1 of inﬁnitely-lived workers. It has risk-
neutral von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences over consumption, and it discounts future payoffs
by a factor d ∈ (0,1). It consumes all its income each period: Ct = Wt ·Nt +pt, where Ct is
consumption, Wt is the average real wage, and pt is the aggregate real proﬁt of ﬁrms, which are
owned by the household.4
2.2 Labor market
A continuum of ﬁrms indexed by i ∈ [0,1] hire workers. At the end of period t −1, a fraction s
of the Nt−1 existing worker-job matches are exogenously destroyed. Workers who lose their job
can apply for a new job immediately. At the beginning of period t, Ut−1 unemployed workers are
looking for a job:
Ut−1 = 1−(1−s)·Nt−1. (1)
At the beginning of period t, ﬁrms open Vt vacancies to recruit unemployed workers. The number
of matches made in period t is given by a constant-returns matching function h(Ut−1,Vt), differ-
entiable and increasing in both arguments. Conditions on the labor market are summarized by the
labor market tightness qt ≡Vt/Ut−1. An unemployed worker ﬁnds a job with probability f(qt) ≡
h(Ut−1,Vt)/Ut−1 = h(1,qt), and a vacancy is ﬁlled with probability q(qt) ≡ h(Ut−1,Vt)/Vt =
h(1/qt,1) = f(qt)/qt. In a tight market it is easy for jobseekers to ﬁnd jobs—the job-ﬁnding
probability f(qt) is high—and difﬁcult for ﬁrms to hire workers—the job-ﬁlling probability q(qt)
is low. Keeping a vacancy open has a per-period cost of c·at units of consumption. The recruit-
ing cost c ∈ (0,+¥) captures the resources that ﬁrms must spend to recruit workers because of
matching frictions. I assume no randomness at the ﬁrm level: a ﬁrm ﬁlls a job with certainty by
opening 1/q(qt) vacancies. Thus, a ﬁrm spends c·at/q(qt) to ﬁll a job. When the labor market is
tighter, a vacancy is less likely to be ﬁlled, a ﬁrm must post more vacancies to ﬁll a vacant job, and
4There is no labor-supply decision (neither number of hours nor labor market participation). This setup is standard
in the literature. It is motivated by empirical work on the cyclical behavior of the labor market that suggests that hours
per worker and labor force participation are quite acyclical (Shimer 2010).
6recruiting is more costly.
Firm i decides the number Ht(i) ≥ 0 of workers to hire at the beginning of period t. The
aggregate number of recruits is Ht =
R 1
0 Ht(i)di. Number of hires Ht, labor market tightness qt,





Upon hiring, Nt(i)=(1−s)·Nt−1(i)+Ht(i)workers are employedin ﬁrm i. Theaggregatenumber
of employed workers is Nt =
R 1
0 Nt(i)di. When the labor market is in steady state, labor market
tightness q is related to employment N by an upward-sloping Beveridge curve that captures the






The wage is set once a worker and a ﬁrm have matched. The marginal product of labor always
exceeds the ﬂow value of unemployment, which is normalized to zero, so there are always mutual
gains from matching. There is no compellingtheory ofwage determinationin such an environment
(Hall 2005a; Shimer 2005). Hence, I consider in the next sections a broad set of wage-setting
mechanisms: generalized Nash bargaining; Stole and Zwiebel (1996) intra-ﬁrm bargaining; and
various reduced-form rigid wages. For now, I use a general wage schedule, which does not result
from a speciﬁc wage-setting mechanism but nests as special cases the schedules studied later:
Wt(i) =W(Nt(i),qt,Nt,at), (4)
where Wt(i) is the wage paid by ﬁrm i to all its workers at time t. W(.) is continuous and dif-
ferentiable in all arguments. This schedule has a natural interpretation. Since technology at and
employment Nt(i) determine current marginal productivity in the ﬁrm, they affect wages paid to
7workers. Labor market tightness in the current period qt determines outside opportunities of ﬁrms
and workers, and also affects wages. Finally in a symmetric environment, because of the Markov
property of the stochastic process for technology, aggregate employment Nt and technology fully
determine the state of the economy and summarize the information set at time t; thus, conditional
expectations as of time t are measurable with respect to (Nt,at). In so far as expectations about
future economic outcomes affect wages, Nt and at affect wages.
2.4 Firms
Firms produce a homogeneous good sold on a perfectly competitive market. Firms take prices as
given and I can normalize the price of the good to 1 in each period. A ﬁrm’s expected sum of














The production function F(·,·) is differentiable and increasing in both arguments. The aggregate
real proﬁt is pt =
R 1
0 pt(i)di. The ﬁrm faces a constraint on the number of workers employed each
period:
Nt(i) ≤ (1−s)·Nt−1(i)+Ht(i). (6)
DEFINITION 1 (Firm problem). Taking as given the wage schedule (4), as well as labor mar-
ket tightness, aggregate employment, and technology {qt,Nt,at}
+¥
t=0, the ﬁrm chooses stochastic
processes {Ht(i),Nt(i)}
+¥
t=0 to maximize (5) subject to the sequence of recruitment constraints
(6). The time t element of a ﬁrm’s choice must be measurable with respect to (at,N−1) where
at ≡ (a0,a1,...,at).
I assumethat theﬁrm maximizationproblem is concave for any recruiting cost c∈(0,+¥). The
unique solution to the ﬁrm problem is characterized by two equations. First, employmentNt(i) and
8number of hires Ht(i) are related by
Ht(i) = Nt(i)−(1−s)·Nt−1(i)
because endogenous layoffs never occur in equilibrium. Second, employment Nt(i) is determined















This Euler equation implies that ﬁrm i hires labor until marginal revenue from hiring equals
marginal cost. The marginal revenue is the marginal product of labor ¶F/¶N. The marginal cost is
the sum of the wageWt(i), the cost of hiring a worker c·at/q(qt), the change in the wage bill from
increasing employment marginally Nt(i)·¶W/¶N, minus the discounted cost of hiring next period
d·(1−s)·Et[c·at+1/q(qt+1)].
2.5 Equilibrium
DEFINITION 2 (Symmetricequilibrium). GiveninitialemploymentN−1 and a stochasticprocess
{at}
+¥




that solve the household and ﬁrm problems, satisfy the law of motion for unemployment (1), the
law of motion for labor market tightness (2), the wage schedule (4), and the resource constraint in








Moreover, the wage {Wt}
+¥
t=0 satisﬁes the condition that no worker-employer pair has an unex-
ploited opportunity for mutual improvement. The wage should neither interfere with the formation
9of an employment match that generates a positive bilateral surplus, nor cause the destruction of
such a match .
The equilibrium deﬁnition imposes that neither workers nor ﬁrms decide to break existing
matches since any match generates some surplus.5 Since workers would never quit, the deﬁnition
restricts wages to remain low enough in response to adverse technology shocks to avoid inefﬁ-
cient separations. As in Hall (2005a), the equilibrium of the model avoids the criticism directed
at sticky-wage models by Barro (1977) because it satisﬁes the criterion that no employer-worker
pair forgoes opportunities for bilateral improvement. In Sections 3 and 4 , I characterize and ana-
lyze equilibria for various speciﬁcations of the production function and the wage schedule. I aim
to determine whether jobs are rationed in these equilibria. But before proceeding, I deﬁne job
rationing.
2.6 Job rationing
Consider a counterfactual environment in which matching frictions are absent. The matching pro-
cess remains the same: ﬁrms open vacancies; ﬁrms and workers match; and the worker-ﬁrm pair
either settles on a wage or dissolves the match. The matching technology characterized by the
matching function h(U,V) remains the same. However, ﬁrms do not need to devote any resources
(time or material) to recruiting because there are no matching frictions: the recruiting cost c con-
verges to 0. When jobs are rationed, some unemployment remains in equilibrium. In other words,
the economy does not converge to full employment even in the absence of matching frictions.
My study of job rationing focuses on static environments without aggregate shocks (at = a for
all t ≥ 0) and with a labor market in steady state (equation (3) holds). This approach has three
major advantages. First, I can analytically study the equilibrium and perform comparative statics
to understand comovementsof technology and labor market variables.6 Second, I can represent the
equilibrium diagrammatically to provide an intuitiveunderstanding of the mechanics of the model.
5The only separations observed in equilibrium are periodic, exogenous destructions of a fraction s of all jobs.
6The comparative-static approach is commonly used to understand theoretical properties of search models of the
labor market (Hagedorn and Manovskii 2008; Mortensen and Nagyp´ al 2007; Shimer 2005).
10Third, the static model delivers the same qualitative predictions as a fully dynamic model.7
3 The Absence of Job Rationing in Existing
Search-and-Matching Models
I specialize the model presented in Section 2 to three inﬂuential search-and-matching models:
the canonical search-and-matching model, its variant with diminishing marginal returns to labor
in production, and its variant with rigid wages. I demonstrate that job rationing is absent from
these models: the economy converges to full employment when recruiting cost c converge to 0.
Hence, existing models consider that matching frictions are the sole source of unemployment and
that eliminating frictions would eliminate unemployment. This underlying assumption strongly
inﬂuences the welfare implications and policy recommendations derived from these models.
3.1 Mortensen-Pissarides model (MP model)
ASSUMPTION 1 (Constant returns to labor). F(N,a) = a·N.

















The MP model, characterized by Assumptions1 and 2, retains the key elements of the canonical
search-and-matching model studied in Pissarides (2000) and Shimer (2005). Lemma 1 shows that
the wage schedule speciﬁed by Assumption 2 corresponds to the generalized Nash bargaining
7In some of the speciﬁcations presented below, labor market tightness in the stochastic environment is invariant to
technology, and solves the same equation as labor market tightness in any static environment. In other speciﬁcations,
the equilibrium of the static model approximates the equilibrium of the fully dynamic model well, with the same
qualitative properties. This approximation is valid for two reasons: (i) the labor market rapidly converges to an
equilibrium in which inﬂows to and outﬂows from employment are balanced because rates of job destruction and job
creation are large (Hall 2005a; Pissarides 2009; Rotemberg2008); at the same time (ii) the recruitingbehaviorof ﬁrms
is scarcely altered when they expect future shocks because technology is quite autocorrelated and shocks are of small
amplitude.
11solution, which allocates a fraction b ∈ (0,1) of the surplus of a match to the worker, and the rest
to the ﬁrm.
LEMMA 1 (Equivalence with Nash bargaining). Let W(·) be speciﬁed in Assumption 2. Assume
that Wt(i) in any period t in any ﬁrm i is determined by generalized Nash bargaining, and b is
workers’ bargaining power. Then Wt(i) =W(Nt(i),qt,Nt,at).













I assume that technology follows a martingale: for all t ≥ 0, Et[at+1] = at. Then equilibrium
labor market tightness is invariant to technology shocks, because the marginal recruiting costs, the
wage, and the marginal product of labor increase in the same proportion as technology. Hence, q








Equation (8) also characterizes equilibrium labor market tightness in a static environment for any
technologylevel a. Since labormarket tightnessis identical in any staticor stochasticenvironment,
I focus on a staticenvironment. Equations(3) and (8) uniquelydeﬁne equilibriumemploymentand
labor market tightness as implicitfunctions N(c) and q(c) of recruiting cost c. Proposition 1 shows
that jobs are not rationed in the MP model because the economy converges to full employment
when matching frictions vanish.
PROPOSITION 1 (Full employment in MP model). Under Assumptions 1 and 2, for any tech-
nology a ∈ (0,+¥), limc→0q(c) = +¥ and limc→0N(c) = 1.
A simple diagram in Figure 1 explains this result. Expressing labor market tightness q as a
function of employment N, I represent equilibrium condition (8) on a plane with employment
8Even thoughthe setup is slightly different, the equilibrium conditionis similar to that derived in Pissarides (2000)
for the canonical model when the ﬂow value of unemployment is zero.
12on the x-axis. The horizontal line is the marginal proﬁt from hiring labor gross of recruiting
expenses, on the left-hand side of (8).9 By construction, gross marginal proﬁt is independent of
labormarkettightnessqand recruitingcostc. Here, thegrossmarginalproﬁt issimplythemarginal
product of labor. The upward-sloping line is marginal recruiting expenses, on the right-hand side
of (8). These expenses are imposed by the presence of a positiverecruiting cost c, directly through
the opening of vacancies, and indirectly through wage bargaining. The intersection of these two
curves determines equilibrium unemployment. As illustrated in Figure 1, when the recruiting cost
decreases, themarginal-recruiting-expensecurveshiftsdownwhilethegross-marginal-proﬁtcurve
is unchanged. Hence equilibrium employment increases. When recruiting cost c converges to 0,
employment N converges to 1: there is full employment.
This result can also be interpreted from the perspective of bilateral bargaining theory. Broadly
speaking,thedifferencebetweenthemarginalproductoflaborandtheﬂowvalueofunemployment
is proportional to the bilateral surplus from a match. Hence the surplus is positiveand independent
from aggregate employment. Once recruiting expenses are sunk, any match generates the same
positive surplus that is shared between ﬁrm and worker by Nash bargaining over wages. When
recruiting cost c converges to 0, recruiting a worker is costless; thus, the net proﬁt from any new
match is positive and ﬁrms open vacancies to create jobs until all workers are employed.
3.2 Large-ﬁrm model with Stole-Zwiebel intra-ﬁrm bargaining (SZ Model)
ASSUMPTION 3 (Diminishing marginal returns to labor). F(N,a) = a·Na, a ∈ [0,1).





The SZ model, characterized by Assumptions 3 and 4, retains the key elements of the large-ﬁrm
search-and-matching models with diminishingmarginal returns to labor and the Stole and Zwiebel
9Both sides of the equation have been normalized by a/(1−b). In the next sections, I normalize other equilibrium
conditions by technology a.
13(1996)intra-ﬁrmbargainingprocedurestudiedinCahuc et al.(2008)andElsby and Michaels(2008).
Themain departurefrom theMPmodelis introducingdiminishingmarginalreturns to labor, which
requires the bargaining procedure to be adapted. Lemma 2 shows that the wage schedule speciﬁed
by Assumption4 corresponds to the Stole and Zwiebel (1996) bargaining solution, which allocates
a fraction b ∈ (0,1) of the marginal surplus to workers, and the rest to the ﬁrm.
LEMMA 2 (Equivalence with Stole and Zwiebel (1996) bargaining). Let W(·) be speciﬁed in As-
sumption4. AssumethatthewageWt(i)inanyperiodt inanyﬁrmiisdeterminedbyStole and Zwiebel
(1996) bargaining, and b is workers’ bargaining power. Then Wt(i) =W(Nt(i),qt,Nt,at).


















As in the MP model, if technology follows a martingale, equilibrium labor market tightness q
is invariant to technology shocks. It is related to equilibrium employment N through the same












Equations (3) and (9) implicitly deﬁne equilibrium employment and labor market tightness in
any static environment as functions N(c) and q(c) of recruiting cost c. Proposition 2 shows that
despite diminishingreturns, jobs are not rationed in the SZ model as the economy converges to full
employment when matching frictions disappear.
PROPOSITION 2 (Full employment in SZ model). Under Assumptions 3 and 4, for any technol-
ogy a ∈ (0,+¥), limc→0q(c) = +¥ and limc→0N(c) = 1.
A diagram in Figure 1 represents equilibrium condition (9). The downward-sloping line is the
marginal proﬁt from hiring labor gross of recruiting expenses, on the left-hand side of (9). Here,
10When a = 1, equilibrium condition (9) is the same as equilibrium condition (8) in the MP model. This is because
the Nash bargaining solution and the Stole and Zwiebel (1996) bargaining solution are identical when the production
function exhibits constant marginal returns to labor.
14the gross marginal proﬁt is the marginal product of labor, minus the component of the wage inde-
pendent of labor market tightness q and recruiting cost c, minus the marginal change in the wage
bill implied by the renegotiation of the wage between the ﬁrm and all the workers. The upward-
sloping line is marginal recruiting expenses, on the right-hand side of (9). The sole difference
from the MP model is that the gross marginal proﬁt is downward sloping, because of diminishing
marginal returns to labor. Jobs, however, are not rationed either in the SZ model: when recruit-
ing cost c decreases to 0, the marginal-recruiting-expense curve shifts down; the gross-marginal-
proﬁt curve is independent of c and positive despite sloping down—it intercepts the N = 1 line
at a·(1−b)/[1−b·(1−a)] > 0; therefore, the economy converges to full employment when c
decreases to 0.
From the perspective of bilateral bargaining, the surplus from a marginal match always remains
positive even though it decreases with aggregate employment because of diminishing marginal
returns. When a marginal worker is recruited, intra-ﬁrm bargaining allocates a positive share of
the marginal surplus to the ﬁrm, and reduces the wage paid to all workers in the ﬁrm. Accordingly,
once recruiting expenses are sunk, the marginal proﬁt from any new match created is positive.
When the recruiting cost is zero, any match generates a positive net proﬁt, and employers expand
employment until all the labor force is employed. In spite of diminishing marginal returns to labor,
jobs are not rationed because wages fall sufﬁciently when an increase in employment reduces the
marginal product of labor.
3.3 Mortensen-Pissarides model with Rigid real wages (MPR Model)
I assume constant marginal returns to labor (Assumption 1) and introduce the Blanchard and Gal´ ı
(2010) wage schedule, which only partially adjusts to technology shocks.




The MPR model, characterized by Assumptions 1 and 5, retains the key elements of the search-
15and-matchingmodelswithrigidrealwagesstudiedinShimer(2004), Hall(2005a), andBlanchard and Gal´ ı
(2010). The main departure from the MP model is the introduction of wage rigidity. Nonetheless,
if technology is bounded: a ∈ [a,a], the rigid wage schedule satisﬁes the equilibrium requirement
that no inefﬁcient separations occur if w0 ≤ a1−g (Hall 2005a). Since wages are rigid (g < 1), they
are not proportional to technology and the invariance property of the MP and SZ models does not
hold: labor market tightness ﬂuctuates in this model.





Equations (3) and (10) implicitly deﬁne equilibrium employment and labor market tightness as
functions N(a,c) and q(a,c) of technology a and recruiting cost c. Proposition 3 shows that in
spite of wage rigidity, jobs are not rationed in the MPR model.
PROPOSITION 3 (Full employment in MPR model). Under Assumptions1 and 5, for any a such
that a ≥ w
1/(1−g)
0 , limc→0q(a,c) = +¥ and limc→0N(a,c) = 1. If a ≤ w
1/(1−g)
0 , for any c > 0,
q(a,c) = 0 and N(a,c) = 0.
A diagram in Figure 1 represents equilibrium condition (10). The horizontal line is marginal
proﬁt gross of recruiting expenses, which is marginal product of labor minus wage, on the left-
hand side of (10). The upward-sloping line is marginal recruiting expenses, on the right-hand side
of (10). The difference with the MP model is that gross marginal proﬁt ﬂuctuates when tech-
nology changes, because of wage rigidity. Jobs, however, are not rationed in the MPR model ei-
ther: when recruiting cost c decreases to 0, the marginal-recruiting-expense curve shifts down; the
gross-marginal-proﬁt curve is independent of c and positive for any technology level a ≥ w
1/(1−g)
0 ;
therefore, the economy converges to full employment when c decreases to 0.
11Let q∗ solve (8). If technology follows a martingale, equilibrium condition (8) in the MP model makes the same















16A constantwage is not theoutcomeofany bargaining, so it could allocatea negativeshare ofthe
bilateral surplus from a match to the ﬁrm or the worker. Since I assume constant marginal returns
to labor, the surplus of any match is proportional to the difference between the level of technology
and the ﬂow value of being unemployed, and it is independent of aggregate employment. For the
equilibrium condition of private efﬁciency to be respected, the wage must be below the level of
technology; otherwise any match that generates a positivesurplus would be dissolved inefﬁciently.
As a consequence, any match generates the same positive proﬁt once recruiting expenses are sunk.
Without recruiting expenses, the net proﬁt from any match is positive and jobs are created until all
the labor force is employed. If the wage is low enough for one match to be proﬁtable, inﬁnitely
many jobs would be proﬁtable without recruiting expenses and the economy would operate at full
employment in spite of wage rigidity.
4 Cyclicality of Frictional and Rationing Unemployment
In existing models, there would not be any unemployment without matching frictions. By con-
struction, matching frictions are the sole source of unemployment. This section presents a model
in which unemployment may result from both matching frictions and job rationing. I present one
possiblesourceofrationing: thecombinationofsomereal wagerigiditywithdiminishingmarginal
returns to labor. I study theoretically how the interaction of these two sources generates cyclical
ﬂuctuations in unemployment.
4.1 Two assumptions
I assume diminishing marginal returns to labor in production (Assumption 3) and real wage rigid-
ity (Assumption 5).12 The introduction of wage rigidity into the model follows the reduced-form
approach of the literature.13 The simple wage schedule in Assumption 5 could be interpreted as
12As shown in Section 3, the assumptions have been introduced separately in existing models, but have never been
combined.
13Most macroeconomic models in the search literature use reduced-form approaches to wage rigidity: Shimer
(2004), Hall (2005a), and Blanchard and Gal´ ı (2010) assume simple rigid-wage schedules; Gertler and Trigari (2009)
17the outcome of complex wage-setting processes normally occurring in ﬁrms. Historic and ethno-
graphic evidence presented below suggests that the schedule captures critical elements of the be-
havior of wages. As in Hall (2005a), it is possible to sustain an equilibrium in which wages never
result in an allocation of labor that is inefﬁcient from the joint perspective of the worker-ﬁrm pair,
even though wages are not completely ﬂexible. For instance, Lemma 3 states that under Assump-
tion6, inefﬁcientworker-ﬁrm separationscan beavoidedwithhighprobabilityifwages are ﬂexible
enough.
ASSUMPTION 6. log(at+1) = log(at)+zt with zt ∼ N(0,s2) and s ∈ (0,+¥).
LEMMA 3. Under Assumptions 3, 5, and 6, a sufﬁcient condition on g such that inefﬁcient sepa-





where F is the cumulative distribution function of N(0,1). Under this condition, there are no
inefﬁcient separations when the technology shock zt satisﬁes F(zt) ≥ p.
Underatechnicalassumptiononthestochasticprocessfollowedbytechnology,Lemma3shows
that some rigidity can be accommodated in equilibrium in a stochastic environment, as inefﬁcient
separations are guaranteed to be avoided as long as the amplitude of negative technology shocks
is not too large.14 Importantly, this condition is independent from recruiting costs. It is therefore
also valid in an environment without matching frictions. The condition is less stringent when the
separation rate s is higher because exogenous separations reduce employment in ﬁrms at the be-
ginning of each period, which increases the marginal product of labor through diminishingreturns.
For a given wage, a higher marginal product makes inefﬁcient separations less likely. Through
the same mechanism, both lower production-function parameter a and lower standard deviation of
technology shocks s reduce the lower bound on the elasticity g described in Lemma 3.
assume that wages can only be renegotiated at distant time intervals.
14I chose Assumption 6 for its simplicity and its empirical relevance. Similar results can be derived with more
complex assumptions on the stochastic process followed by technology.
184.2 Existence of job rationing





Equations (3) and (11) uniquely deﬁne equilibrium employment and labor market tightness as
implicit functions N(a,c) and q(a,c) of technology and recruiting cost.
PROPOSITION 4 (Existence of job rationing). Under Assumptions 3 and 5, for any technology







there exists a unique NR(a) ∈ (0,1) such that limc→0N(a,c) = NR(a). NR(a) solves
a·Na−1−w0·ag−1 = 0, (12)










With technology a ∈ (0,aR), equation (12) admits a unique solution NR(a) < 1. NR(a) is equi-
librium employment in an environment without matching frictions for, in the absence of frictions,
c = 0 and equilibrium condition (11) becomes equation (12). Proposition 4 states that jobs are ra-
tioned when technology is low enough, because the economy remains below full employment even
when matching frictions disappear. The mechanism leading to job rationing is simple. The wage
agreed upon by ﬁrms and job applicants does not fall as much as the marginal product of labor
when technology declines, because of wage rigidity. Thus, the wage may be above the marginal
product of the last workers in the labor force, because of diminishing marginal returns to labor. In
that case, irrespective of matching frictions, not all workers can be proﬁtably hired.
15In the Appendix,I comparethe unemploymentand labor market tightness series obtained when I solve this model
exactly, and when I solve it in a series of static environment. While the time series obtained with these two numerical
solution methods are quantitatively different, they are qualitatively very similar.
19Even without matching frictions, the labor market may not clear because there is no mechanism
to bring wages down to the market-clearing level. Firms meet job applicants sequentially, one at a
time. The timing of meetings prevents ﬁrms from auctioning off jobs as in a perfectly competitive
setting. Yet, the wage is privately efﬁcient because it is below the marginal productivity of any
worker paired with a ﬁrm, so theﬁrm makes a non-negativeproﬁt by paying the wage and pursuing
the match.
To measure the shortage of jobs on the labor market, independent of matching frictions, I deﬁne
rationing unemploymentUR as









Matching frictions impose positive recruiting expenses on ﬁrms, which contribute to the marginal
cost of labor, and lead ﬁrms to curtail employment. To measure unemployment attributable to
positive recruiting costs, I deﬁne frictional unemploymentUF as
UF(a,c) ≡U(a,c)−UR(a). (15)
A diagram in Figure 1 represents equilibrium condition (11). The downward-sloping line is
gross marginal proﬁt, on the left-hand side of (11). Here, gross marginal proﬁt is marginal prod-
uct of labor minus the wage. The upward-sloping line is marginal recruiting expenses, on the
right-hand side of (11). Rationing unemployment is unemployment prevailing when the recruit-
ing cost c converges to zero. It is obtained at the intersection of the gross-marginal-proﬁt curve
with the x-axis because the marginal-recruiting-expense curve shifts down to the x-axis when c
falls to 0. Total unemployment is obtained at the intersection of the gross-marginal-proﬁt and
marginal-recruiting-expense curves, and frictional unemployment is the difference between total
and rationing unemployment. The diminishing-return and wage-rigidity assumptions (Assump-
tions 3 and 5 ) are necessary for the existence of job rationing. Without the diminishing-return
assumption , the gross-marginal-proﬁt curve would be ﬂat and would never intersect the x-axis on
(0,1), so rationing unemployment would always be nil. Without the wage-rigidity assumption, the
20gross-marginal-proﬁt curve would not shift. There would be no guarantee that it intersects the x-
axis and rationing unemployment may never be positive. With rigid wages, the intersection occurs
for low levels of technology.
This result can be interpreted from the perspective of bilateral bargaining. In the model with
job rationing, there is a range of technology and employment in which the wage would be too
high for ﬁrms to extract a positive share of the surplus from worker-ﬁrm matches. In fact, when
technology is low enough and employment is high enough, the wage is above the marginal product
of labor, and, even when recruiting expenses are sunk, ﬁrms would make a negative proﬁt from a
match. Unlike in the models of Section 3, jobs are rationed when technology is low enough: even




ment, I study how technology, as well as total, rationing and frictional unemployments comove by
performing comparative statics with respect to technology.
PROPOSITION 5 (Cyclicality of frictional and rationing unemployment). Under Assumptions 3
and 5, for any technology a ∈ (0,aR): ¶U/¶a < 0, ¶UR/¶a < 0, and ¶UF/¶a > 0.
Around any equilibrium at which jobs are rationed, we have the following comparative-static
results: when technology decreases, total unemployment increases, rationing unemployment in-
creases, but paradoxically, frictional unemployment decreases. This proposition uncovers a novel
mechanism behind unemployment ﬂuctuations. In expansions, when technology is high enough,
matching frictions account for all unemployment. But when technology is low enough and falls
further in recessions, the rationing of jobs becomes more acute, driving the rise in total unem-
ployment. Simultaneously, the number of unemployed workers attributable to matching frictions
falls.
A diagram in Figure 1 providesintuition. When technologydecreases, thegross-marginal-proﬁt
21curve shifts down because the marginal product of labor falls while rigid wages adjust downwards
only partially. At the current employment level, gross marginal proﬁt falls short of marginal re-
cruiting expenses. Firms reduce hiring to increase gross marginal proﬁt. Lower recruiting efforts
by ﬁrms reduce labor market tightness and recruiting expenses. The adjustment process continues
until a new equilibrium with higher unemployment is reached, when gross marginal proﬁt equals
marginal recruiting expenses.
When technology decreases, the gross-marginal-proﬁt curve shifts down and rationing unem-
ployment is mechanically higher. Irrespective of matching frictions, the shortage of jobs is more
acute, and there are more unemployed workers and fewer vacancies. Once frictions are taken into
account, a ﬁrm posting a vacancy will receive many applications from the large pool of unem-
ployed workers, and it will be able to ﬁll its vacancy rapidly at low cost. From the employment
level prevailing when c = 0, a smaller reduction in employment sufﬁces to bring the economy to
equilibrium. Consequently, frictional unemployment diminishes.
4.4 Empirical evidence
There is ample evidence in favor of the two critical assumptions of diminishing returns and wage
rigidity. The model aims to describe cyclical ﬂuctuations, and production inputs do not adjust fully
to changes in employment at business cycle frequency. Capital is especially slow to adjust. If
capital and labor are the only production inputs and capital is assumed to be constant in the short
run, the production function takes the form proposed in Assumption 3 and exhibits diminishing
marginal returns to labor. At longer horizon, the production function could exhibit diminishing
marginal returns to labor if some production inputs such as land or managerial talent are in ﬁxed
supply.
Furthermore, ethnographic evidence supports the rigid wage schedule chosen in Assumption 5.
The schedule depends neither on the marginal product of labor nor on labor market conditions.
The disconnect between wages and both marginal productivity and labor market conditions can be
explained by the rise of the personnel management movement after World War I, which led to the
widespread adoption of internal labor markets within ﬁrms (Jacoby 1984). Doeringer and Piore





























































































































































Figure 1: EQUILIBRIA IN VARIOUS SEARCH-AND-MATCHING MODELS
Notes: These diagrams describe equilibria in static environments in the MP, SZ, and MPR models, as well as in the
modelwith job rationing. The two diagramsfor the MP modelrepresentthe equilibriumfora calibratedrecruitingcost
(left)andlowerrecruitingcosts (right). Thetwo diagramsforthemodelwithjobrationingrepresentthedecomposition
of unemployment into rationing and frictional unemployment for high technology (left) and lower technology (right).
Diagrams are obtained by plotting equilibrium conditions (8) (for the MP model), (9) (for the SZ model), (10) (for the
MPR model), and (11) (for the model with job rationing) for a continuum of employment levels. The model with job
rationing is calibrated in Table 1. Other models are calibrated in the Appendix.
23(1971) document that in internal labor markets, motivated by concerns for equity within ﬁrms,
wages are tied to job description and are insensitiveto labor market and marginal productivity con-
ditions. Furthermore, labor market institutions sometimes hamper downward wage adjustments in
the face of slack labor markets. For instance, Temin (1990) and Cole and Ohanian (2004) explain
the persistence of high real wages during the Great Depression by the National Industry Recov-
ery Act of 1933. More recently, unions vetoed nominal pay cuts during the Finnish depression of
1991-1993 despite rampant unemployment (Gorodnichenko et al. 2009). Lastly, managerial best
practices across countries and industries oppose pay cuts even when the labor market is slack, be-
cause managers believe pay cuts antagonize workers and reduce proﬁtability (Agell and Lundborg
1995; Bewley 1999; Blinder and Choi 1990; Campbell and Kamlani 1997). Natural experiments
studying workers’ reactions to pay cuts strongly support managers’ views (Krueger and Mas 2004;
Mas 2006).
5 Quantitative Analysis
The previous section presented evidence supporting the diminishing-return and wage-rigidity as-
sumptions. In this section, I directly calibrate wage rigidity and diminishing marginal returns to
be consistent with microdata on wage dynamics and aggregate data on the labor share. I move be-
yond the comparative-static results by computing impulse response function in the fully dynamic
model. I use the Fair and Taylor (1983) algorithm to quantify comovements in technology, total
unemployment, frictional unemployment, and rationing unemployment when the model is simu-
lated with actual U.S. technology. A byproduct of the quantitative analysis is to verify that the
calibrated model describes well the U.S. labor market.
5.1 Calibration
I calibrate all parameters at weekly frequency (a week is 1/4 of a month and 1/12 of a quarter).
Table 1 summarizes calibrated parameters. I ﬁrst estimate the stochastic process for technology
in U.S. data. I construct log technology as a residual log(a) = log(Y)−a·log(N). Output Y
24and employment N are seasonally-adjusted quarterly real output and employment in the nonfarm
business sector constructed by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) Major Sector Productivity and
Costs (MSPC) program. The sample period is 1964:Q1–2009:Q2. To isolate ﬂuctuations at busi-
ness cycle frequency , I follow Shimer (2005) and take the difference between log technology and
a low frequency trend—a Hodrick-Prescott (HP) ﬁlter with smoothing parameter 105. I estimate
detrended log technology as an AR(1) process: log(at+1)= r·log(at)+zt+1 with zt+1 ∼N(0,s2).
With quarterly data, I obtain an autocorrelation of 0.897 and a conditional standard deviation of
0.0087, which yields r = 0.991 and s = 0.0026 at weekly frequency.
I now calibrate the labor market parameters: job destruction rate (s), recruiting cost (c), and
matching function (w, h). I estimate the job destruction rate from the seasonally-adjusted monthly
series for total separations in all nonfarm industries constructed by the BLS from the Job Openings
and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS) for the December 2000–June 2009 period.16 The average
separation rate is 0.038, so s = 0.0095 at weekly frequency. I estimate the recruiting cost from
microdata gathered by Barron et al. (1997) and ﬁnd that on average, the ﬂow cost of opening a
vacancy amounts to 0.098 of a worker’s wage.17 This number accounts only for the labor cost
of recruiting. Silva and Toledo (2005) account for other recruiting expenses such as advertising
costs, agency fees, and travel costs, to ﬁnd that 0.42 of a worker’s monthly wage is spent on each
hire. Unfortunately, they do not report recruiting times. Using the average monthly job-ﬁlling
rate of 1.3 in JOLTS, 2000–2009, the ﬂow cost of recruiting could be as high as 0.54 of a worker’s
wage. I calibrate recruiting cost as 0.32 of a worker’s wage, the midpointbetween the two previous
16December 2000–June 2009 is the longest period for which JOLTS is available. Comparable data are not available
before this date.
17Using the 1980 Employment Opportunity Pilot Project survey (2,994 observations), they ﬁnd that on average
employers spend 5.7 hours per offer, make 1.02 offers per hired worker, and take 13.4 days to ﬁll a position. Hence
the ﬂow cost of maintaining a vacancy open is 5.7/8×1.02/13.4 ≈ 0.054 of a worker’s wage. Adjusting for the
possibility that hiring is done by supervisors who receive above-averagewages as in Silva and Toledo (2005), the ﬂow
cost of keeping an open vacancy is 0.071 of a worker’s wage. With the 1982 Employment Opportunity survey (1,270
observations), the corresponding numbers are 10.4 hours, 1.08 offers, 17.2 days, and the ﬂow cost is 0.106. With the
1993 survey conductedby the authors for the W. E. Upjohn Foundationfor Employment Research (210 observations),
the numbers are 18.8 hours, 1.16 offers, 30.3 days, and the ﬂow cost is 0.117.
25estimates.18 Next, I specify the matching function as
h(U,V) = w·Uh·V1−h
with h = 0.5, in line with empirical evidence (Petrongolo and Pissarides 2001). Last, I estimate
matching efﬁciency w with seasonally-adjusted monthly series for number of hires, vacancy level,
and unemployment level constructed by the BLS from JOLTS and the Current Population Survey
(CPS) over the 2000–2009 period. For each month i, I calculate qi as the ratio of vacancies to
unemployment and the job-ﬁnding probability fi as the ratio of hires to unemployment. The least
squares estimateofw, which minimizesåi(fi−w·q
1−h
i )2, is 0.93. At weekly frequency, w=0.23.
Next I calibrate the elasticity g of wages with respect to technology based on estimates obtained
from panel data recording wages of individual workers. These microdata are more adequate be-
cause they are less prone to compositioneffects than aggregate data. The survey of the literature by
Pissarides (2009) places the productivity-elasticityof wages of existingjobs in the 0.2–0.5 range in
U.S. data. Pissarides (2009) argues, however, thatmodels shouldbecalibrated with theelasticityof
wages of newly created jobs and not existing jobs. Estimating wage rigidity for newly created jobs
is a arduous task. The standard approach is to measure wage rigidity among job movers. Unfor-
tunately the composition of jobs accepted over the cycle ﬂuctuates, biasing the analysis. Workers
accept lower-paid, stop-gap jobs in recessions, and move to better jobs during expansions, biasing
the estimated elasticity upwards. This composition effect is difﬁcult to control for. A recent study
by Haefke et al. (2008) estimates the elasticity of wages of job movers with respect to productivity
using panel data for U.S. workers. They do not control for the cyclical composition of jobs; thus,
their estimate is an upper bound on the elasticity of wages. For a sample of production and super-
visory workers over the period 1984–2006, they obtain a productivity-elasticity of total earnings
of 0.7. I set g = 0.7, a conservative estimate of wage rigidity.19
18Using the average unemployment rate and labor market tightness in JOLTS, I ﬁnd that 0.89 percent of the total
wage bill is spent on recruiting.
19This estimate of wage rigidity is conservative for two reasons: (i) 0.7 is an upward-biased estimate of the elas-
ticity of wages; (2) 0.7 is an estimate of the elasticity of wages with respect to labor productivity Y/N, whereas g is
the elasticity of wages with respect to technology a = Y/Na. While technology and productivity are highly corre-
lated, productivity is less volatile than technology and therefore an estimate of the elasticity of wages with respect to
26Table 1: PARAMETER VALUES IN SIMULATIONS OF THE MODEL WITH JOB RATIONING
Interpretation Value Source
d Discount factor 0.999 Corresponds to 5% annually
a Steady-state technology 1 Normalization
r Autocorrelation of technology 0.991 MSPC, 1964–2009
s Standard deviation of shocks 0.0026 MSPC, 1964–2009
s Separation rate 0.0095 JOLTS, 2000–2009
w Efﬁciency of matching 0.23 JOLTS, 2000–2009
h Unemployment-elasticity of matching 0.5 Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001)
g Wage rigidity 0.70 Haefke et al. (2008)
c Recruiting cost 0.21 0.32× steady-state wage
a Returns to labor 0.67 Matches labor share= 0.66
w0 Steady-state real wage 0.67 Matches unemployment = 5.8%
Note: All parameters are calibrated at weekly frequency.
So far, I have estimated parameters from microdata or aggregate data, independently of the
model. To conclude, I calibrate the steady-state wage w0 and the production function parameter
a such that the steady state of the model matches average unemployment u = 5.8% and average
labor share ls = 0.66 in U.S. data. Average unemployment is computed from the seasonally-
adjusted monthly unemployment rate constructed by the BLS from the CPS for the 1964–2009
period. These targets imply steady-state employment n = 0.951 and steady-state labor market





which yields a = 0.67 and w0 = ls·na−1 = 0.67.
technology would be below 0.7.
27Table 2: SUMMARY STATISTICS, QUARTERLY U.S. DATA, 1964–2009.
U V q W Y a
Standard Deviation 0.168 0.185 0.344 0.021 0.029 0.019
Autocorrelation 0.914 0.932 0.923 0.950 0.892 0.871
Correlation
1 -0.886 -0.968 -0.239 -0.826 -0.478
– 1 0.974 0.191 0.785 0.453
– – 1 0.220 0.828 0.479
– – – 1 0.512 0.646
– – – – 1 0.831
– – – – – 1
Notes: All data are seasonally adjusted. The sample period is 1964:Q1–2009:Q2. Unemployment rate U is quarterly
average of monthly series constructed by the BLS from the CPS. VacancyrateV is quarterlyaverage of monthlyseries
constructed by merging data constructed by the BLS from the JOLTS and data from the Conference Board, as detailed
inthetext. Labormarkettightnessq is theratioofvacancyto unemployment. Real wageW is quarterly,averagehourly
earning in the nonfarm business sector, constructedby the BLS CES program,and deﬂated by the quarterly average of
monthly CPI for all urban households, constructed by BLS. Y is quarterly real output in the nonfarm business sector
constructed by the BLS MSPC program. log(a) is computed as the residual log(Y)−a·log(N) where N is quarterly
employment in the nonfarm business sector constructed by the BLS MSPC program. All variables are reported in log
as deviations from an HP trend with smoothing parameter 105.
5.2 Simulated moments
I verify that the model provides a sensible description of reality by comparing important simulated
moments to their empirical counterparts. I focus on second moments of the unemployment rate
U, the vacancy rate V, labor market tightness q =V/U, real wage W, outputY, and technology a.
Table 2 presents empirical momentsin U.S. datafor the 1964:Q1–2009:Q2period. Unemployment
rate, output, and technology are described above. The real wage is quarterly, average hourly earn-
ing in the nonfarm business sector constructed by the BLS Current Employment Statistics (CES)
program, and deﬂated by the quarterly average of monthly Consumer Price Index (CPI) for all
urban households, constructed by BLS. To construct a vacancy series for the 1964–2009 period, I
merge the vacancy data from JOLTS for 2001–2009, with the Conference Board help-wanted ad-
vertising index for 1964–2001.20 I take the quarterly average of the monthly vacancy-level series,
20The Conference Board index measures the number of help-wanted advertisements in major newspapers. It is a
standard proxy for vacancies (for example, Shimer 2005). The merger of both datasets is necessary because JOLTS
28and divide it by employment to obtain a vacancy-rate series. I construct labor market tightness as
the ratio of vacancy to unemployment. All variables are seasonally-adjusted, expressed in logs,
and detrended with a HP ﬁlter of smoothing parameter 105.
Next, I log-linearize my model around steady state and perturb it with i.i.d. technology shocks
zt ∼ N(0,0.0026).21 I obtain weekly series of log-deviations for all the variables. I record values
every 12 weeks for quarterly series (Y, W, a). I record values every 4 weeks and take quarterly
averages for monthly series (U, V, q). I discard the ﬁrst 100 weeks of simulation to remove the
effect of initial conditions. I keep 100 samples of 182 quarters (2,184 weeks), corresponding to
quarterly data from 1964:Q1 to 2009:Q2. Each sample provides estimates of the means of model-
generated data. I compute standard deviations of estimated means across samples to assess the
precision of model predictions. Table 3 presents the resulting simulated moments. Simulated and
empirical moments for technology are similar because I calibrate the technology process to match
the data. All other simulated moments are outcomes of the mechanics of the model.
The ﬁt of the model is very good along several critical dimensions. First, the model ampliﬁes
technology shocks as much as observed in the data. In U.S. data, a 1-percent decrease in tech-
nology increases unemployment by 4.2 percent and reduces vacancy by 4.3 percent. It therefore
reduces labor market tightness, measured by the vacancy-unemployment ratio, by 8.6 percent.22
In the model, a 1-percent decrease in technology increases unemployment by 6.2 percent, reduces
vacancy by 7.0 percent, and therefore reduces labor market tightness by 13.2 percent. Second,
the response of wages to technology shocks in the model and the data are indistinguishable. In
both cases, a 1-percent decrease in technology decreases wages by 0.7 percent. Third, simulated
and empirical slopes of the Beveridge curve are almost identical. The slope, measured by the
correlation of unemployment with vacancy, is -0.92 in the model and -0.89 in the data. Last,
autocorrelations of all variables and behavior of output in the model match the data.
began only in December 2000 while the Conference Board data become less relevant after 2000, owing to the major
role played by the Internet as a source of job advertising.
21The Appendix describes the log-linear model in details.
22The elasticity of unemployment with respect to technology eU
a is the coefﬁcient obtained in an OLS regression
of log unemployment on log technology. This coefﬁcient can be derived from Table 2: eU
a = r(U,a)×s(U)/s(a) =




29Table 3: SIMULATED MOMENTS WITH TECHNOLOGY SHOCKS
U V q W Y a
Standard Deviation 0.119 0.142 0.256 0.014 0.024 0.019
(0.021) (0.022) (0.044) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003)
Autocorrelation 0.939 0.847 0.913 0.884 0.898 0.884
(0.020) (0.045) (0.028) (0.036) (0.032) (0.036)
Correlation
1 -0.931 -0.979 -0.986 -0.991 -0.986
(0.020) (0.007) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
– 1 0.986 0.935 0.929 0.935
(0.004) (0.019) (0.021) (0.019)
– – 1 0.975 0.974 0.975
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
– – – 1 0.999 1.000
(0.001) (0.000)
– – – – 1 0.999
(0.000)
– – – – – 1
Notes: Results from simulating the log-linearized model with stochastic technology. All variables are reported as
logarithmic deviations from steady state. Simulated standard errors (standard deviations across 100 simulations) are
reported in parentheses.
However, the model does not perform well along one important dimension: the correlation of
labor market variables and wages with technology. Simulated correlations of unemployment, va-
cancy, and labor market tightness with technology are close to 1, but empirical correlations are
below 0.5. Similarly, aggregate wages vary twice as much in the data as in the model. Demand
shocks, ﬁnancial disturbances, and nominal rigidities, absent from the model but empirically im-
portant, could explain these discrepancies. The simplicity of the model prevents it from achieving
the degree of volatility observed in the data: while ampliﬁcation of technology shocks is as strong
as in the data, simulated standard deviations of wageW and labor market variablesU,V, and q are
inferior to their empirical counterparts because some sources of volatility are omitted.
This simulation exercise contributes to a large literature on the role of wage rigidity in ex-
plaining unemployment ﬂuctuations. Following the Shimer (2005) critique of the standard search-
30and-matching model, several papers introduced wage rigidity to increase unemployment volatility
(Gertler and Trigari 2009; Hall 2005a; Hall and Milgrom 2008). These papers were criticized for
exaggerating the rigidity of wages in spite of empirical evidence suggesting that wages for newly
hiredworkersarequiteﬂexible(Haefke et al.2008;Mortensen and Nagyp´ al2007;Pissarides2009).
Calibrating wage rigidity with an estimate from microdata on new hires, I show that in fact even a
small amount of wage rigidity sufﬁciently ampliﬁes technology shocks.23
5.3 Impulse response functions
To conﬁrm the comovements of technology with unemployment and its components in a fully dy-
namic model, I compute impulse response functions (IRFs) in the log-linear model.24 In steady
state, u = 5.8%, uR = 1−(a/w0)
1/(1−a) = 2.4%, and uF = 3.4%. Steady-state rationing unem-
ployment is positive because steady-state technology a = 1 is below aR = 1.025, which is is the
lowest technology level for which all unemployment is frictional. By contrast, in a static environ-
ment with a = aR, U =UF = 4.8% and UR = 0%. Steady-state rationing unemployment depends
naturally on the steady-state wage w0 and diminishing returns a, but not on wage rigidity g.
Next, I extend the deﬁnitions of rationing and frictional unemployment given by (14)– (15) to a
23My model matches empirical evidence better than the models presented in Section 3, because both wage rigidity
and diminishing returns contribute to improving empirical ﬁt. On the one hand, Shimer (2005) showed that a search-
and-matchingmodel in whichwages are Nash bargainedis unableto amplifytechnologyshocks. In this paper, I derive
another version of this result: in the MP model with Nash bargaining and in the SZ model with Stole and Zwiebel
(1996) bargaining, if recruiting cost and ﬂow value of unemployment are linear in technology, and if technology is a
martingale, labor market tightness is invariant to technology. This result, comparable to a result in Blanchard and Gal´ ı
(2010), holds because the bargained wages are proportional to technology. Hence, neither the MP model nor the SZ
model can ﬁt the data. On the other hand, a simulation exercise shows that there is too much ampliﬁcation in the
MPR model. Following the same calibration strategy, I set c = 0.32 and w0 = 0.991 for the MPR model. If wages
are completely rigid ( g = 0), the simulated technology-elasticity of labor market tightness is more than 20 times the
elasticity of 8.6 in U.S. data. If g=0.7, wages are as rigid as in my model but the technology-elasticityof labor market
tightness remains more than 4 times as large as in the data. In the MPR model, technologyshocks are overlyampliﬁed
because of the absence of diminishing marginal returns to labor, which dampen the response to shocks.
24Applying Lemma 3 , I ﬁnd that if g ≥ 0.51, wages are ﬂexible enough to avoid inefﬁcient separations with
probability below 1 percent. With g ≥ 0.62, they occur with probability below 0.1 percent. Thus, with the calibration
g =0.7, under a technologyshock of one standard deviation, inefﬁcient separations do not occur. I can safely linearize
the system of equilibrium equations as described in Appendix.















If at / ∈ (0,aR), I deﬁne UR
t ≡ 0 and UF
t ≡Ut. Let ˇ xt ≡ dlog(Xt) denotes the logarithmic deviation


















Unlike the steady-state level uR of rationing unemployment, its log-deviation ˇ uR
t does depend on
wage rigidity g: when wages are more rigid (g is lower), rationing unemployment responds with
more amplitude to a technology shock.
Figure 2 shows the IRFs to a negative technology shock of one standard deviation (−s =
−0.0026). On impact, output, consumption, labor market tightness, the number of hires, and
wages fall discretely. The reduced number of hirings together with the constant amount of exoge-
nous job destruction, lead unemployment to slowly build up and peak around 4 months after the
technology shock, in line with the ﬁndings in Stock and Watson (1999). After a negative tech-
nology shock, rationing unemployment jumps on impact, whereas frictional unemployment drops.
The IRFs uncover a dynamic effect that complements the comparative-static results of Section 4.
When technology is in the interval (0,aR), and an adverse technology shock hits the economy,
rationing unemployment increases immediately. This increase is the driving force behind the rise
in total unemployment. As frictional unemployment falls on impact, matching frictions retard
the increase of unemployment in the short run. They delay the spike of unemployment by about
a quarter because of intertemporal substitution effects. In the periods following a drop in tech-



















































Figure 2: IRFS TO A NEGATIVE TECHNOLOGY SHOCK
Notes: Impulse response functions (IRFs) represent the logarithmic deviation from steady state for each variable.
IRFs are obtained by imposing a negative technology shock of −s = −0.0026 to the log-linear model. The time
period displayed on the x-axis is 250 weeks.
advantage of a slack labor market to recruit at low cost now, instead of recruiting in a tighter labor
market in the future. This dynamic effect, together with the comparative-static effect highlighted
in Proposition 5, generate cyclical ﬂuctuations in frictional unemployment.
5.4 Historical decomposition of unemployment
To better understand how unemployment and its components ﬂuctuate over the cycle, I con-
struct historical time series for rationing and frictional unemployment from the technology se-
ries measured in U.S. data. In this simulation, the economy departs substantially from the steady
state so I do not use the log-linear model. Instead I solve exactly the nonlinear model with the
Fair and Taylor (1983) shooting algorithm. This algorithm solves dynamic rational expectation
33models period by period. Each period, it iterates over the path of expected values for endogenous
(employment and labor market tightness) and exogenous (technology) variables, until this path
converges from an arbitrary path to a path of rational expectations, consistent with the predictions
of the model.
To simplify computations, I approximate the AR(1) process for technology as a 200-state
Markov chain (Tauchen 1986). Since the model operates at weekly frequency, I interpolate the
quarterly technology series from the data into a weekly series. I discretize the weekly series in the
state space of the Markov chain and simulate the model with the resulting series of states. Figure 3
shows that model-generated and actual unemployment match well.25 Both series have the same
standard deviation and their correlation is 0.55. The model explains a good amount of ﬂuctuations
in unemployment , even though the ﬁt of the model is not perfect. For instance, actual unemploy-
ment reached 9.2 percent in 2009:Q2 whereas the model only predicts 8.1 percent, suggesting that
factors other than a technological decline spurred unemployment in 2008–2009.
From technology measured in U.S. data and simulated unemployment, I generate rationing
and frictional unemployment using (16) and (17). Figure 4 shows the resulting decomposition of
simulated unemployment. When unemployment is below 5.0 percent, it is solely frictional. Above
5.0percent, bothrationingandfrictionalunemploymentcontributetototalunemployment. Risesin
total unemployment are driven by increases in rationing unemployment; simultaneously, frictional
unemploymentfalls. Indeed, spikes in unemploymentare accompanied by sharp drops in frictional
unemployment and steep rises in rationing unemployment, as illustrated by current events. The
model predicts that in 2004:Q1, unemployment was at 4.8 percent, all of which was frictional.
When unemployment peaked at 8.1 percent in 2009:Q2, frictional unemployment dropped to 1.8
25The simulated series displayed is obtained by extracting observations every 12 weeks from the weekly unemploy-
ment series generated by the model. The actual series displayed is obtained by taking the quarterly average of the
monthly unemployment-rateseries constructed by the BLS from the CPS, and detrending this quarterly series with an
HP ﬁlter of smoothing parameter 105. These transformations make the two series comparable.




























Figure 3: ACTUAL AND SIMULATED U.S. UNEMPLOYMENT, 1964–2009
Notes: Actual unemployment rate is quarterly average of monthly series constructed by the BLS from the CPS.
Simulatedunemploymentrateis generatedwhenthemodelis stimulatedbythequarterlytechnologyseriesconstructed
from BLS output and employment data. Actual technology and unemployment are seasonally adjusted and detrended
with a HP ﬁlter with smoothing parameter 105. The time period is 1964:Q1–2009:Q2. I solve the (nonlinear) model
with the Fair and Taylor (1983) shooting algorithm.
percent and rationing unemployment climbed to 6.3 percent.26,27
Over the period 1964:Q1–2009:Q2, simulated unemployment is 5.8 percent on average; it is
mostly composed of frictional unemployment, which averages 3.6 percent; rationing unemploy-
ment averages only 2.2 percent. But rationing unemployment is twice as volatile as frictional
unemployment; quarterly simulated standard deviations are 0.016 and 0.008 respectively. I also
verify with this simulation that inefﬁcient job separations never occur during the entire sample
period: hiring always remains positive.
26Technology is not adjusted for variable factor utilization. Therefore, ﬂuctuations of measured technology could
be partly endogenous. The Appendix addresses this issue by simulating another series for unemployment using the
quarterly, utilization-adjusted total factor productivity series (TFP) from Fernald (2009) as driving force. This TFP
series accounts for labor hoarding and variable capital utilization. The ﬁt of the model remains good, and the decom-
position is very similar to that obtained with technology as driving force. These results conﬁrm the robustness of my
quantitative ﬁnding that ﬂuctuations in the composition of unemployment are large at business cycle frequency.
27The Appendix approaches the decomposition from another angle. I determine the technology series such that
model-generated unemployment exactly matches actual unemployment, and construct rationing and frictional unem-
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Figure 4: DECOMPOSITION OF SIMULATED U.S. UNEMPLOYMENT, 1964–2009
Notes: The graph decomposes the unemployment series generated when the (nonlinear) model is stimulated by the
quarterly technology series constructed from BLS output and employment data. Technology is seasonally adjusted
and detrended with a HP ﬁlter with smoothing parameter 105. The period is 1964:Q1–2009:Q2. I solve the model




This paper develops a tractable model of the labor market in which unemployment stems from
matching frictions and job rationing. Real wage rigidity and diminishing marginal returns to labor
giverisetojobrationinginaneconomicequilibrium. Thepaperassessesthecontributionofeach of
these two sources to cyclical ﬂuctuations in unemployment. The picture of recessions that emerges
in this analysis is one where falling technology leads to an acute shortage of jobs. This shortage
drivesan increaseintotalunemployment. Simultaneously,theamountofadditionalunemployment
attributable to matching frictions falls because it becomes easier for ﬁrms to recruit.
366.2 Relation to the macroeconomic literature on unemployment
This paper bridges the gap between two important but separate bodies of research: the search-and-
matching literature, and the job-rationing literature. The search-and-matching model developed in
Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) and Pissarides (2000) has become the standard theory of equilib-
rium unemployment. It is an attractive framework to understand the relation between unemploy-
mentand labormarket ﬂows. But recent literaturehighlightsits shortcomingsinexplainingperiods
of high unemployment (Shimer 2005). The job-rationing literature offers an alternative account of
unemployment based on the premise that wages may be above market-clearing level leading to
a shortage of jobs, such as in efﬁciency-wage models (Solow 1979; Stiglitz 1976), gift-exchange
models (Akerlof 1982), insider-outsider models (Lindbeck and Snower 1988), and social-norm
models (Akerlof 1980). Although these models contribute to our understanding of periods of high
unemployment, they were not successfully integrated in the prevalent macroeconomic model.
This paper departs signiﬁcantly from the search-and-matching literature, in which the labor
market clears in the absence of matching frictions. In my model the labor market may not clear in
equilibrium even when recruiting cost is zero, because there is no mechanism to bring wages down
to market-clearing level. Since ﬁrms meet job applicants one at a time, sequentially, they cannot
auction off jobs as in the perfectly competitive setting.
The integration of matching frictions and job rationing offers a unifying treatment of unem-
ployment, which accounts for labor market ﬂows, costly matching, and a possible shortage of jobs
resulting from a failure of the labor market to clear even in the absence of matching frictions.
Importantly, the two sources of unemployment are introduced in an economic equilibrium: wages
never trigger the inefﬁcient dissolutionof a worker-ﬁrm pair generating a positivebilateral surplus.
This paper shows that unemployment is best described as a combination of frictional and rationing
unemployment. Search-and-matching theory describes the labor market well in normal and good
times; job-rationing theory describes it well in bad times; but only their integration adequately
explains unemployment over the entire business cycle.
376.3 Normative implications
How wemodel unemployment—astheresult of matchingfrictions oras a lack of jobs—hasimpor-
tant normative consequences. The two sources of unemployment engender different welfare costs
and warrant different unemployment policies. My description of ﬂuctuations in the components of
unemployment therefore has novel policy implications.
The MP model usually predicts small welfare costs of unemployment. Unemployment is even
optimal under Hosios (1990) condition. When distortions such as rigid wages are introduced (as
in the MPR model), unemployment may be inefﬁciently high but improving matching on the labor
market effectively reduces unemployment in models that abstract from job rationing. Additionally
in models in which matching frictions are the sole source of unemployment, policies providing
disincentives for unemployed workers to exert search effort, such as generous unemployment in-
surance, always trigger large increases in aggregate unemployment.
This paper offers a more nuanced theory of unemployment in which matching frictions are the
most important source of unemployment in expansions, and job rationing is the most important
source of unemployment in recessions. Job rationing generates unemployment that is pure waste
from a social point of view because unemployed workers who are willing to work at a wage be-
low the market wage cannot ﬁnd a job; unlike in the MP model, their being unemployed is not
justiﬁed by the presence of matching frictions.28 This theory has several normative implications.
Unemployment may be very costly in recessions. Policies should be directed at improving match-
ing in periods of moderate unemployment, and creating jobs in periods of high unemployment.
A generous unemployment insurance, which reduces the search effort of unemployed workers,
increases unemployment signiﬁcantly only in expansions, but not in recessions. Hence, unem-
ployment insurance should be lower in expansions to provide incentives to search for jobs and
reduce aggregate unemployment; it should be higher in recessions to provide better insurance at
little cost on aggregate unemployment.
28In a MP model satisfying Hosios (1990) condition, unemployment is socially optimal because the presence of
unemployedworkers searchingfor a job reduces the amountof resourcesspent on recruiting,and increases the amount
of resources allocated to consumption.
386.4 Directions for future research
This paper is a ﬁrst attempt at providing a uniﬁed framework to study unemployment, and it has
limitations that must be addressed in the future. The rigid wage schedule speciﬁed in my model
is both theoretically and empirically valid, but it does not explain where wage rigidity comes
from. Empirical observations suggest that wage rigidity is a reality of the labor market. Yet it
cannot be generated by standard wage-setting mechanisms.29 An important research agenda is to
design a wage-setting mechanism explaining the wage rigidity observed in the data to improve our
understanding of job rationing and unemployment ﬂuctuations. Second, ﬂows out of employment,
in particular layoffs, seem to be quite countercyclical (Elsby et al. 2009). My model abstracts from
this issue and assumes a constant rate of job destruction. Understanding job destructions (both
layoffs and voluntary quits) and their interaction with job rationing is a topic for future research.
Third, the model is simplistic in that there are only technology shocks. There is growing evidence
thatothershocksalsoperturb thelabormarket, andfutureworkshouldexplorehowdemandshocks
or ﬁnancial disturbances affect the behavior of unemployment and its components.
29While microfounded models of wage rigidity have been developed, they remain too complex to be analytically
tractable in macroeconomic models (for example, Rudanko 2009).
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42A Proofs
Proof of Propositions 1, 2, and 3. Equilibriumcondition(8)uniquelydeﬁnesqasanimplicitfunc-
tion of c in a static environment in the MP model. Assume that ∃L ≥ 0, q < L for all c > 0. As
















For 0 < c < 1
l ·(1−b), condition (8) cannot hold; thus limc→0q(c) = +¥. Equation (3) implies
limc→0N(c) = 1. A similar argument allows me to prove Proposition 2, using equilibrium condi-
tion (9) and the fact that equation (3) deﬁnes N as an increasing function of q. A similar argument
allows me to prove Proposition 3, using equilibrium condition (10).
Proof of Proposition 4. Obvious using equilibrium condition (11), as well as the continuity of all
functions involved.
Proof of Proposition 5. Equation (11) yields ¶N/¶a > 0 and ¶q/¶a > 0. When a ∈ (0,aR), equa-
















































Using the comparative statics above and ¶q/¶q < 0, I infer ¶NF/¶a > 0. To conclude, it sufﬁces
to notice thatU(a) = 1−(1−s)·N(a),UF(a) = s·N(a)+NF(a), and UR(a) = 1−NR(a).
B Other Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. Let Lt denote the value to the representative household of having a marginal
member employed after the matching process in period t, expressed in consumption units. Let Ut
43denote the value to the representative household of having a marginal member unemployed.
Lt =Wt +d·Et [{1−s·(1− f(qt+1))}Lt+1+s·(1− f(qt+1))·Ut+1]
Ut = d·Et [(1− f(qt+1))·Ut+1+ f(qt+1)·Lt+1].
These continuation values are the sum of current payoffs, plus the discounted expected continu-
ation values. Combining both conditions yields the household’s surplus from an established job
relationship:
Lt −Ut =Wt +d·Et [(1−s)·(1− f(qt+1))·(Lt+1−Ut+1)].
In this setting, the ﬁrm’s surplus from an established relationship is simply given by the hiring
cost c·at/q(qt), since a ﬁrm can immediately replace a worker at that cost during the matching
period. Assume that wages are continually renegotiated. Since the bargaining solution divides the
surplus of the match between the worker and ﬁrm with the worker keeping a fraction b ∈ (0,1) of

























Proof of Lemma 2. The wage scheduleW(Nt) is determined by Nash bargaining over the marginal
surplus from a match. To simplify, I assume that the wage that solves the bargaining problem does
not generate layoffs. I verify at the end of the derivation that the solution actually satisﬁes this
condition. As in the proof of Lemma 1, the surplus to the representative household of having a
marginal member employed in an established job relationship is:
Lt −Ut =Wt +d·Et [(1−s)·(1− f(qt+1))·(Lt+1−Ut+1)]. (A1)
Following the derivations in Section 2, the marginal proﬁt to the ﬁrm of having an additional













This marginal proﬁt corresponds to the surplus of the established relationship accruing to the ﬁrm.






44Since the bargaining solution divides the surplus of the match between the worker and ﬁrm with
the worker keeping a fraction b ∈ (0,1) of the surplus, the worker’s marginal surplus each period
















With F(Nt,at) = atNa









Proof of Lemma 3. I determine a condition on the stochastic process for technology, as well as
the parameters of the model, such that endogenous layoffs do not occur. A ﬁrm’s optimal hiring
behavior is detailed in Lemma A1.





There exist marginal costs nH
t (i) > nL
t (i) such that:
(i) if ˆ nt(i) < nL
t (i), ﬁrm i lays workers off;
(ii) if ˆ nt(i) ∈ [nL
t (i),nH
t (i)], ﬁrm i freezes hiring;
(iii) if ˆ nt(i) > nH
t (i), ﬁrm i hires workers.










The ﬁrm’s problem is a concave maximization problem, so it admits a unique solution determined
by theﬁrst-order conditions. The highestmarginalrevenuethat ﬁrm i can obtainin periodt without


























t (i) and nH
t (i) requires computing Et [¶Lt+1/¶Nt]. Let F be the s−algebra generated
by future realizations of the stochastic process {at,t ≥t +1}, taking as given the information set
at time t. I partition F as follows:
F = F +∪F −∪+¥
h=1F h. (A5)
F + is the subset of future realizations of {at} such that there is hiring next period. F − is the
subset such that there are layoffs next period. Last, for h ≥ 1, F h is the subset such that there is
a hiring freeze for the h next periods. Let p+ = P(F +), p− = P(F −), and ph = P(F h) be the
measure of these subsets. Using the law of total probability over this partition:


















































t (i) and nH
t (i) are well deﬁned, and depend on the stochastic process {qt,t ≥ t +1}, as well
46as on employment at the beginning of period t: (1−s)Nt−1(i). I assume that marginal cost is
strictly increasing in Nt(i), so that the ﬁrm’s optimizationhas a unique solution(the marginal proﬁt
function strictlydecreases withNt(i)). nL
t (i) is thelowest marginal cost that the ﬁrm can achieveby
keeping all its workforce. This is achieved by freezing hiring. nH
t (i)> nL
t (i) is the lowest marginal
cost the ﬁrm can achieve, while recruiting workers. It is achieved by recruiting an inﬁnitely small
amount of workers. Then, the optimal decision of the ﬁrm is obtained by comparing nL
t (i),nH
t (i),
and ˆ nt(i). The optimal decision of a monopolist is characterized by the equality of marginal costs
and marginal revenues. If ˆ nt(i) < nL
t (i), ﬁrm i must reduce its workforce to increase its gross
marginal proﬁt and reduce its marginal costs, which implies layoffs. Conversely, if ˆ nt(i) > nH
t (i),
ﬁrm i must hire more workers to reduce its gross marginal proﬁt and increase its marginal cost
until both are equal. If ˆ nt(i) ∈ [nL
t (i),nH
t (i)], ﬁrm i optimally freezes hiring.
In a symmetric environment, if a ﬁrm freezes hiring, all ﬁrms do so, qt = 0, c·at/q(qt) = 0,
and for all i, nL
t (i) = nH
t (i). This means that hiring freezes occur with probability 0. Either all
ﬁrms recruit, or they all lay workers off. Using Lemma A1 and its proof, we know that in a
symmetric environment a necessary and sufﬁcient condition to avoid layoffs in period t is ˆ nt ≥ nH
t .
Moreover, Et [c·at+1/q(qt+1)] = Et [c·at+1/q(qt+1)|F +]·p+ because Et [c·at+1/q(qt+1)|F −] =
0, and ph = 0 for all h, using the partition deﬁned by (A5). Therefore

































































This is equivalent to imposing that frictional unemployment always be positive. As shown in


















Let F(·) be the cumulative distribution function of the N(0,1) distribution. Given that zt is nor-


















I ﬁrst characterize the steady state of the model, and then describe the log-linearized equilibrium























ˇ xt ≡dlog(Xt) denotes the logarithmicdeviation of variable Xt. The equilibrium is described by the
following system of log-linearized equations:
• Deﬁnition of labor market tightness:
(1−h)· ˇ qt = ˇ ht − ˇ ut−1




· ˇ nt−1 = 0
• Law of motion of employment:
ˇ nt = (1−s)· ˇ nt−1+s· ˇ ht
• Resource constraint:
ˇ yt = (1−s1)· ˇ ct +s1·








ˇ yt = ˇ at +a· ˇ nt
• Wage rule:
ˇ wt = g· ˇ at
• Firm’s Euler equation:
−ˇ at +(1−a)· ˇ nt +s2· ˇ wt +s3·
￿




h· ˇ qt+1+ ˇ at+1
￿
= 0
49Table 4: PARAMETER VALUES USED IN SIMULATIONS OF BENCHMARK MODELS.
Interpretation Value Source
MP model:
c Recruiting cost 0.32 0.32×w
b Worker’s bargaining power 0.86 Matches unemployment = 5.8%
MPR model:
c Recruiting cost 0.32 0.32×w
w0 Steady-state real wage 0.991 Matches unemployment = 5.8%
SZ model:
c Recruiting cost 0.22 0.32×w
a Returns to labor 0.21 Matches labor share= 0.66
b Worker’s bargaining power 0.86 Matches unemployment = 5.8%
Notes: All parameters are calibrated at weekly frequency.
with s2 = w· 1




ˇ at = r· ˇ at−1+zt
D Calibration of Various Search-and-Matching Models
I follow the same calibration strategy as in Section 5. All calibrated parameters are summarized in
Table 4.
D.1 Calibration of the MP model















50which pins down the bargaining power b = 0.86.
D.2 Calibration of the MPR model







I target u = 5.8%, or equivalently q = 0.45. This pins down w0 = 0.990, and c = 0.32.




. The steady-state wage equation, ﬁrm’s Euler equation, and deﬁnition of










ls = w·n1−a. (A10)















Equation (A11) identiﬁes k=0.67, given that I target ls=0.66 and q=0.45. Equation (A12) then





E Comparison of Different Numerical Solution Methods
Figure 5 compares the time series for unemployment and labor market tightness generated by the
model with two different numerical solution methods: (i) a series of equilibria in static environ-
ments that abstract from aggregate shocks to technology and dynamics of unemployment; and (ii)
the exact solution to the nonlinear model, which accounts fully both for the dynamics of unem-
ployment and rational expectations of stochastic process of technology and labor market variables.






























































Figure 5: LABOR MARKET TIGHTNESS AND UNEMPLOYMENT ACROSS SOLUTION METHODS.
The series of equilibria in static environments is obtained by solving the system of equa-
tions (1), (3), and (11) to determine employment N, unemploymentU, and labor market tightness
q for each realization of technology a. I then plot the series of steady-state unemployment and
labor market tightness corresponding to the series of realization of technology.
The exact solution to the model is obtained by using the Fair and Taylor (1983) shooting algo-
rithm. This algorithm solves dynamic rational expectation models period by period, by iterating
in each period over the path of expected values for endogenous (employment and labor market
tightness) and exogenous (technology) variables, until this path converges from an arbitrary path
to a path of rational expectations, consistent with the predictions of the model.
While the time series obtained with these two numerical solution methods are quantitatively
different, they are qualitatively similar. The main difference between these two labor market tight-
ness series is that qt spikes and plummets more drastically with the steady-state solution method.
This is because after a positive technology shock, ﬁrms do not take into account the fact that tech-
nology will eventually revert to a lower, mean value, making recruiting less proﬁtable. Therefore,
ﬁrms are predicted to recruit too much in the steady-state solution method after a positive shock.
For the same reason, ﬁrms are predicted to recruit too little after a negative shock, because they
do not expect that technology will eventually revert to a higher, mean value. This discrepancy in
the predicted recruiting behavior of ﬁrms also affects predicted unemployment, but the difference
between the two series is relatively small. To conclude, solving the model without accounting for
aggregate shocks offers a good approximation to the exact solution.
F Quantitative Analysis With Capacity-Adjusted TFP Series
Technology is not adjusted for variable factor utilization. Therefore, ﬂuctuations in technology
may be partly endogenous. To address this issue, I construct another series of model-generated
unemployment using the quarterly, utilization-adjusted total factor productivity series (TFP) from
Fernald (2009) as the model driving force. Actual and model-generated unemployment are shown
on the bottom graph in Figure 6. The ﬁt of the model remains good.




























Figure 6: ACTUAL UNEMPLOYMENT, AND UNEMPLOYMENT GENERATED FROM ACTUAL TFP
MEASURED IN U.S. DATA, 1964–2009.
Notes: Actual unemployment is the quarterly average of seasonally-adjusted monthly series constructed by the BLS
from the CPS. Model-generated unemployment series generated when the model is stimulated by the quarterly,
utilization-adjusted TFP series constructed by Fernald (2009). ActualTFP and unemployment are detrended with a
HP ﬁlter with smoothing parameter 105. The time period is 1964:Q1–2009:Q2. I solve the (nonlinear) model with the
Fair and Taylor (1983) shooting algorithm.
I also repeat the decomposition exercise using utilization-adjusted TFP series. The decompo-
sition is presented on Figure 7 and appears to be very similar to that obtained with technology as
driving force. This new result conﬁrms the robustness of my quantitative ﬁnding that ﬂuctuations
in the composition of unemployment are large at business cycle frequency.
G Another Historical Decomposition of Unemployment
In this section, I approach the decomposition exercise presented in Section 5 from another angle. I
decompose actual U.S. unemployment into rationing and frictional series instead of decomposing
model-generated unemployment. To do so, I need to uncover the time series for technology that
would generate observed unemployment with my model. Of course, this model-generated tech-
nology does not exactly match actual technology, just as model-generated unemployment cannot
match actual unemployment if I stimulate the model with actual technology.
To uncover the technology series, I assume that unemployment is a function of labor market






















e ¬ Rationing unemp.
Frictional unemp.







Figure 7: DECOMPOSITION OF UNEMPLOYMENT GENERATED FROM ACTUAL TFP MEASURED
IN U.S. DATA, 1964–2009.
Notes: The graph decomposes the unemployment series generated when the (nonlinear) model is stimulated by the
quarterly,utilization-adjustedTFP series constructedby Fernald(2009). Actual TFP and unemploymentare detrended
with an HP ﬁlter with smoothing parameter 105. The time period is 1964:Q1–2009:Q2. I solve the model with the
Fair and Taylor(1983) shootingalgorithm. Frictionaland rationingunemploymentare constructedfrom(16) and (17).
are very large, while the amplitude of technology shocks is small; thus, unemployment rapidly
converges to a stochastic equilibrium in which inﬂows to and outﬂows from employment are bal-
anced; hence, the path of stochastic equilibria for unemployment, which satisﬁes (A14), is a good
approximation to the dynamic path of unemployment (Hall 2005b; Rotemberg 2008). I solve the
model exactly using a shooting algorithm, and I compare this exact solution to the approximate
solution obtained if I assume that (A14) holds at any time. The results are displayed in Figure 8.
The two solutions are very similar which conﬁrms (A14) is a good approximation to the actual
behavior of unemployment.
Equation (A14), together with the assumption that technology shocks follow a Markov process,
allows me to express implicitly equilibrium labor market tightness, employment, and unemploy-
ment as a function of the current technology level. Then solving the nonlinear, rational-expectation
model boils downto solvinga system of nonlinearequations with as manyequations as the number
of states for technology, which can easily be done numerically. Since each possible realization of
technology is associated with a given unemployment rate, I can associate each observation of U.S.
unemployment rate to a technology level. By doing so, I determine the technology series such that
model-generated unemployment exactly matches actual unemployment, and I construct rationing
and frictional unemployment rates from this series.
ThedecompositionisshowninFigure9, and isquantitativelysimilarto thatpresentedin thetext
in Figure 4. Current events illustrate how the composition of unemployment drastically changes






























































Figure 8: LABOR MARKET TIGHTNESS AND UNEMPLOYMENT ACROSS SOLUTION METHODS.
over the business cycle. In 2007:Q2, actual unemployment was at 4.9 percent, all of which was
frictional. In 2008:Q2, actual unemployment was at 5.8 percent, of which 4.3 percent was fric-
tional unemployment and 1.5 percent was rationing unemployment. Finally, in 2009:Q2, actual
unemployment reached 9.2 percent, frictional unemployment fell to 1.6 percent, and rationing un-
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Figure 9: DECOMPOSITION OF ACTUAL U.S. UNEMPLOYMENT, 1964–2009
Notes: The graph decomposes actual unemployment, which is the quarterly average of seasonally-adjusted monthly
series constructed by the BLS from the CPS. Actual unemployment is detrended with an HP ﬁlter with smoothing
parameter 105. The time period is 1964:Q1–2009:Q2.
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